翻訳と辞書
Words near each other
・ "O" Is for Outlaw
・ "O"-Jung.Ban.Hap.
・ "Ode-to-Napoleon" hexachord
・ "Oh Yeah!" Live
・ "Our Contemporary" regional art exhibition (Leningrad, 1975)
・ "P" Is for Peril
・ "Pimpernel" Smith
・ "Polish death camp" controversy
・ "Pro knigi" ("About books")
・ "Prosopa" Greek Television Awards
・ "Pussy Cats" Starring the Walkmen
・ "Q" Is for Quarry
・ "R" Is for Ricochet
・ "R" The King (2016 film)
・ "Rags" Ragland
・ ! (album)
・ ! (disambiguation)
・ !!
・ !!!
・ !!! (album)
・ !!Destroy-Oh-Boy!!
・ !Action Pact!
・ !Arriba! La Pachanga
・ !Hero
・ !Hero (album)
・ !Kung language
・ !Oka Tokat
・ !PAUS3
・ !T.O.O.H.!
・ !Women Art Revolution


Dictionary Lists
翻訳と辞書 辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ]
スポンサード リンク

continuous game : ウィキペディア英語版
continuous game

A continuous game is a mathematical generalization, used in game theory. It extends the notion of a discrete game, where the players choose from a finite set of pure strategies. The continuous game concepts allows games to include more general sets of pure strategies, which may be uncountably infinite.
In general, a game with uncountably infinite strategy sets will not necessarily have a Nash equilibrium solution. If, however, the strategy sets are required to be compact and the utility functions continuous, then a Nash equilibrium will be guaranteed; this is by Glicksberg's generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. The class of continuous games is for this reason usually defined and studied as a subset of the larger class of infinite games (i.e. games with infinite strategy sets) in which the strategy sets are compact and the utility functions continuous.
==Formal definition==
Define the ''n''-player continuous game G = (P, \mathbf, \mathbf) where
:: P = is the set of n\, players,
:: \mathbf= (C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n) where each C_i\, is a compact metric space corresponding to the i\, ''th'' player's set of pure strategies,
:: \mathbf= (u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_n) where u_i:\mathbf\to \R is the utility function of player i\,
: We define \Delta_i\, to be the set of Borel probability measures on C_i\, , giving us the mixed strategy space of player ''i''.
: Define the strategy profile \boldsymbol = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_n) where \sigma_i \in \Delta_i\,
Let \boldsymbol_ be a strategy profile of all players except for player i. As with discrete games, we can define a best response correspondence for player i\, , b_i\ . b_i\, is a relation from the set of all probability distributions over opponent player profiles to a set of player i's strategies, such that each element of
:b_i(\sigma_)\,
is a best response to \sigma_. Define
:\mathbf(\boldsymbol) = b_1(\sigma_) \times b_2(\sigma_) \times \cdots \times b_n(\sigma_).
A strategy profile \boldsymbol
* is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
\boldsymbol
* \in \mathbf(\boldsymbol
*)
The existence of a Nash equilibrium for any continuous game with continuous utility functions can been proven using Irving Glicksberg's generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem.〔I.L. Glicksberg. A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 3(1):170–174, February 1952.〕 In general, there may not be a solution if we allow strategy spaces, C_i\, 's which are not compact, or if we allow non-continuous utility functions.

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
ウィキペディアで「continuous game」の詳細全文を読む



スポンサード リンク
翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース

Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.